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2Design Agents: Overview
• Introduction
• Survey of Literature
• The Phenomenon: Buildup and Demise






• By definition, they perform during early part of acquisition 




– Other (Source Selection, Supply Chain Management, 
Testing, Validation)
• “Design Agent” sometimes synonymous with “Lead 
Systems Integrator”
… all premised on the notion that Industry is more efficient, 
performing traditionally (but not inherently) Governmental 
functions
4Design Agency & Acquisition 
Reform: Changing Climate
• Post-Cold War: Dramatic DoD budget cuts 
• Resource scarcity -> Reforms of 1990s
• FARA of 1996 – host of competing values 
(Efficiency vs. Fairness, Accountability, 
Transparency)
• Ten Years Later: Political / Regulatory 
Climate Changes
• Public-Private Sector Dynamics
Where are we now? Who’s really in charge?
5Survey of Literature and Theory
• No Rigorous Analyses of Design Agency…yet!
• Contracting Out Debate (Goodsell, 2007; Globerman & 
Vining, 1996; Smith & Smyth, 1996; Miles & Snow,1992)
• Demanding Customer and the “Hollow Organization”
(Crawford & Krahn, 1998; Rickover, 1962)
• Lead Systems Integrator (Army’s Future Combat System –
Flood & Richard, 2005)
• Large-Scale Systems Integration (Baron, 2007)
• Besal & Whitehead (2001): Contractors in T&E
6Design Agent Contracts: Dollar Value






































7Design Agent Contracts: Prevalence
• 1995-2001: Dozens of announcements for  Design 
Agent work (Mk41 VLS, AN/SQS-89, PFG-2, Mk15 
CIWS, CEC)
• 2002:  Phenomenon climaxed with ~$2.9B Design 
Agent contract award for DD(X) 
• 2003-2008:  Purity of Design Agent work 
increasingly suspect (DDG-51 class services, etc.)  
8Design Agent-Led Programs: Mk 41 VLS
Lockheed Martin: Design Agent for 
software, systems engineering and 
integration of Mk 41 Vertical Launching 
System.
United Defense Limited Partnership
(now BAE Systems): Design Agent for 
structural and mechanical portions, VLS 
canisters.
> $91M in contract awards
Photo: Global Security.org
9Design Agent-Led Programs: Trident Missile 
Charles Stark Draper Lab 
Design Agent for MK-2, MK-3, MK-5, 
and MK-6 guidance test equipment 
>$276M in contract awards (FY95$)
Photo: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Design Agent-Led Programs: Mk 53 DLS
Sippican
(now Lockheed Martin) 
Hardware, Software, Systems Engineering   
& Design Agent services for Mk 53 Decoy 
Launching System.
>$5M in contract awards (FY01$)
Photo: U.S. Navy             
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Design Agent-Led Programs: Mk 92 FCS
Lockheed Martin
Design Agent Engineering & Tech Support 
for Mk 92 Fire Control System.
>$43M in contract awards (FY06$)
Photo: GlobalSecurity.org
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Design Agent-Led Programs: CIWS
Raytheon 
Engineering & Design Agent Services for 
Mk 15 PHALANX Close-In Weapon 
System.
> $16M in contract awards (FY99$)
Photo: Defense Industry Daily
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Design Agent-Led Programs: SM-2
Raytheon
Design Agent services and test 
equipment for Standard Missile 2.
> $65 million in contract awards
Photo: U.S. Navy
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Design Agent-Led Programs:  CEC
Raytheon  
Design Agent to support existing   
Cooperative Engagement Capability  
baselines, equipment and computer 
program installations at Raytheon’s 
engineering labs, land-based test sites, 
Navy field activities, Fleet assets and 
other Government assets.
> $200 million in contract awards
Photo: U.S. Navy
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Design Agent-Led Programs: Nuclear Subs
Electric Boat            
(now General Dynamics) 
Design Agent services for submarines 
and shore facilities.
> $800 million in contract awards
Photo: U.S. Navy
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Design Agent-Led Programs: DD(X)
Ingalls Shipbuilding (now 
Northrop Grumman)
Agent for the design, build and test of 
engineering development models for major 
subsystems and components for the DD(X) 
class of destroyers. Note: When program 
transitioned to Detail Design Integration 
phase, acquisition strategy changed.
> $2.9 Billion in contract awards (FY02$)
Art: DDG1000.com
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Design Agent-Led Programs: Carriers
(Ship Alts & Logistics)
Newport News                   
(now Northrop Grumman)
Design Agent for ship alteration and 
logistics support packages. 
> $20 million in contract awards (FY04$)
Photo: U.S. Navy
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Design Agents: Research Questions
• Has the Design Agent phenomenon driven 
up acquisition costs for DoD programs?
(Quantitative Analysis)
• Have Design Agent initiatives generally 
weakened DoD’s ability to coordinate and 
control its major programs?
(Qualitative Analysis)
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Design Agent vs. Navy-Led: 
Programs Studied
Cooperative Engagement Capability (Raytheon) 
– Hardware and software
– System of sensors
Virginia-Class Submarines (Electric Boat)
– System of systems
Arleigh Burke Destroyers (Navy)
– System of systems
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Cooperative Engagement Capability
Recurring SCN estimates range from $6.586M to $11.23M
Raytheon performed Design Agent role; however…
Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren was Software Support 
Activity and Systems Engineering/Integration Agent. 
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab was Technical 
Direction Agent, developing specs and prototyping systems.
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Virginia-Class Subs
Recurring SCN estimates of $1.9B       
(FY05$) were based on two ships 
per year and joint-production 
efficiency. 
Actual Average Unit Production 
Cost of ~ $2.3 billion (FY05$) were 
driven by long production breaks 
and quantity of one ship per year.
Electric Boat (GD) was Design 
Agent;  Northrop Grumman was 
alternate shipbuilder.
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Arleigh Burke Destroyers (DDG 51) 
First Ship was ~ $1.1B (FY85$) 
AUPC for Follow Ships ~ $900M (TY$)
Volatility driven by cost-quantity 
relationships, as well as industrial base 
concerns and program interdependencies 
(delay of DD-21; alignment of LPD-17). 
Strong Navy leadership steered DDG-51 to 
long-term success.
Navy was Design Agent;  Lockheed Martin 
was Combat Systems Integrator.
Bath Iron Works & Ingalls: Shipbuilders.
Photo: U.S. Navy                
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Design Agents:  Case Studies
• Cooperative Engagement Capability: 
Ongoing development & improvement (~20 
years) overseen by well-balanced team.
• Virginia Class: Cost overrun driven by cost-
quantity relationship and schedule dynamics. 
• Arleigh Burke Class: Conscientious 
balancing of cost-quantity relationship and 
program interdependencies by Navy leaders.
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Design Agents: Findings
• Cost comparisons of “Design Agent”-led 
programs to traditional DoD-led programs are 
difficult, as roles often transcend labels.
• Cost comparisons of Military / civilian / contractor 
personnel are straightforward, but must be 
understood in (qualitative) context.
• Cost-sharing arrangements (Facilities, Software) 
as well as intra-Government transactions 
(GFE/GFI) must be clearly understood.
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Design Agents: Findings
• Delegation of leadership responsibility puts the 
Navy’s technical competence and program-
management capacity at risk.
• Pressured by profit watchers, industry may 
sacrifice quality to meet schedule and cost goals.
• Poor progress is often discovered too late.
• Concentration of industry power
– Stifles innovation / erects firewalls
– Decreases diversity of subcontractors
– Compromises fair business practices 
Best arrangements balance power among 
FFRDCs, Industry, and Government entities.
26
Recommendations
“…another order of attenuation is reached when contractors 
do all the managing related to the mission.”
– Goodsell, 2007
• Boost Government role throughout development 
• Rebalance risk and rewards for all
• Re-invent the Navy’s personnel system
• Re-ignite competitive zeal 
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Concluding Thoughts…
• Continue to weigh costs and benefits, as market 
forces influence opportunities for competition, 
expansion of supplier base, and as regulatory 
changes create new dynamics. 
• Stay tuned to political feasibility & public trust 
issues, as well as evolving norms for business 
practices in times of war. 
• The policy cycle never ends!
